U.S.-Ukraine FoundationEnglishUkrainian
   Join Our Business e-Newsletter & Update:  
Home | Sitemap | Contact Us
 

Ukrainian Elections, 2010 - an OSCE Observer's Perspective 
By Orest Deychakiwsky

I delivered a slightly modified and abbreviated version of the following at The Washington Group (TWG) conference on the Ukrainian presidential elections held on Saturday [February 13, 2010 in Washington, DC].

Even before Victor Yanukovich's win in the presidential election, there seemed to have been an early declaration of victory - not from either of the two remaining candidates- but from Moscow.  Sure, voters trounced incumbent President Victor Yushchenko out of office Jan. But viewing the Ukrainian elections through this perspective fails to give credit to the true victors of this winter's elections -- whether one likes the outcome or not - the Ukrainian people, who held "impressive" elections which met most OSCE and other international democratic standards.

When you get right down to it, the fact these election results (both rounds) were not preordained is a success in itself. The fact voters did not know who would win is a relatively rare concept in this part of the world and puts Ukraine in stark contrast with neighbors such as Russia and Belarus. Moreover, it is hard to imagine many post-Soviet countries removing an incumbent president. 

As an OSCE election observer in various OSCE countries, I've observed more than one sham election in other post-Soviet countries, including the bad ones that precipitated the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004.  And these elections in Ukraine - as well as the three prior ones - December 2004, 2006, 2007 - compare very favorably to the vast majority of elections in the post-Soviet region, and even favorably with those in some new EU countries such as Bulgaria and Romania. 

International observers from the OSCE called the vote of "high quality" after the first round and "impressive" and "good, or even very good" after the second round, notwithstanding problem areas. An overwhelming 95 plus percent of the some 700 OSCE-led International Election Observation Mission observers in the first round and about 600 in the second round representing 45 countries assessed both the voting and the vote count as either good of very good - you can't do much better than that.  (These results were based on forms election observers filled out and faxed to OSCE in Kyiv throughout election day and after the vote count, and which statisticians analyzed before the preliminary statement was issued on the day after the elections, so there's a methodology here, so these are not just strictly subjective assessments).   The OSCE mission observed in more than 2,200 polling stations in every oblast in Ukraine and also observed several hundred vote counts during each round.  And most of the various international observers (and domestic non-partisan observer groups) reached more or less the same conclusions.

But more importantly than international observers in ensuring a clean election is that there were sufficient checks and balances domestically:  first and foremost, you had representation from the various candidates at the district electoral commissions and precinct election commissions - i.e. in each polling station, including an even number from both the frontrunners in the runoffs  just last week.  Moreover, you had party/candidate observers in the vast majority of polling stations, plus domestic non-partisan observers in a fair number - so sometimes you entered a polling station when voting was light and saw more observers than anyone else. In short, you had plenty of folks watching each other.  This certainly diminishes instances of fraud, although doesn't eradicate it completely, of course.

I do think that the elections results reflected the will of the people.  At the same time, these elections were not perfect -- no doubt there was some cheating -- and I don't blame Yuliya Tymoshenko for contesting the results.  To do so is not inappropriate on her part if there is evidence of fraud.  On the other hand, there is the argument that Ukraine, hit hard by the global crisis, can't afford more months of infighting and political uncertainty.

Problems/shortcomings:

There were unclear provisions in the election law and last-minute court decisions contributed to Election Day confusion within the election commissions in some precincts.  This resulted in a relatively small number of people being denied the vote, or facing extra hassles (i.e. having to go to the court or the register maintenance bodies (RMBs) that maintain the voter lists or District Election Commission, instead of just having the precinct electoral commission decide by majority vote. Of course, it wasn't at all helpful that on the eve of the first round January 17th, a last minute court decision rejected almost immediately by the Central Election Commission (CEC) led to some confusion being applied to voters who wanted to be included on the voter lists on election day itself. (I saw this myself in several precincts in Kharkiv). 

OSCE observers - including my partners and me in both rounds (a Netherlands Senator in the first round in Kharkiv and Canadian MP in the second round in Odesa) - as well as Helsinki Commission colleagues deployed elsewhere - witnessed additional shortcomings - none of which would have affected the outcome in any significant way.  However, overall the voting and counts we witnessed were quite good.  Also, we didn't notice any monkey business with homebound voting ("po-domakh") which there were concerns regarding; no excessively high percentages of voters voting from home which would have raised a red flag.  However,  there was confusion as to what was required in order to vote from home based on the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeals reversing an earlier decision and reintroducing a requirement that only voters with a medical certificate could be listed as homebound.  As with the question of inclusion on the voter lists, this happened on the eve of the election, followed by a CEC rejection.

And in Kharkiv during the second round, we went to the district election commission to see the transfer of protocols from the precinct election commission at which we were observing the vote count, and saw some pretty intense procedural battles - based on different interpretations of the rules -- between the Tymoshenko and Yanukovich people.  Alas, this made for a very long night. 

There were also problems in between the two rounds - the issue of the head of the High Administrative Court being unresolved and politicized; claims about 1.5 million extra ballots to be printed illegally and attempts to replace the head of the ballot printing house and seize it, parliament removing Interior Minister Lutsenko who was subsequently reappointed as Acting Interior Minister.  But the one that got the most attention was the last minute amendment to the election law - only a few days before February 7 - basically saying that a quorum for members of an election commission to make a legally binding decision would not be required (something pushed through by Regions because of fears that Yuliya might pull her people off the commissions, thus depriving them of a quorum and disrupting the election).  This didn't happen, but it did poison the atmosphere. It's inappropriate to amend the election law between two rounds; to change the rules in the middle of the game.

The OSCE and others have rightly recommended that the unified election code be adopted before holding the next elections and that there needs to be greater clarity in the election law. 

But, bottom line, even with these and other violations and irregularities (including during the campaign), international observers reached the conclusion that there was no massive fraud and these violations were not systemic or systematic.  Also, violations were not, as in 2004, exclusively on one side.

What Next?

Of course, good elections alone do not make a democracy.  Ukraine has developed an open and pluralistic political system and media freedoms have expanded - among the positive legacies of the Orange Revolution many of whose promises remain unfulfilled.  Unfortunately, Ukraine has also witnessed poor governance, destructive and incessant infighting, pervasive corruption, and political instability -- in part due to no clear delineation of powers between the roles of prime minister and president.  This has led to policy paralysis. 

The new president and all of the political leadership - including the opposition (which will most likely be led by Yuliya Tymoshenko) will need to work with the IMF and others to resolutely further economic reforms, tackle corruption and an underdeveloped judiciary which have so debilitated rule of law in Ukraine, and stabilize a fractious political system.  Nothing would be more important to strengthen Ukraine's independence, especially its energy independence, reduce its vulnerability to outside pressures (i.e. Russia, which still views Ukraine as being part of its sphere of influence), and to further integration with the European Union, something that even the more Moscow-oriented Yanukovich asserts as a goal.

I believe that Ukraine will neither become a total Russian puppet (although Tymoshenko would have been more decisively Euro-oriented) and won't revert to authoritarianism. After all, there is pluralism in Ukrainian politics and there will be a vigorous opposition.  And even the Regions party itself is not monolithic, and many of the oligarchs see their future in Europe, also, their businesses compete with Russian ones.  I think a major challenge is to develop a system that is not constantly paralyzed in disputes over the authority of the President, the Prime Minister, and parliament.

Finally, he United States has a solid record of standing with the Ukrainian people over the decades in support of their struggle for freedom and democracy.  This broad support cuts across branches of government and party lines. Now is certainly not the time to give up on Ukraine, and I'm confident that we won't.  Ukraine does matter and it's crucial that we remain engaged with this strategically important country, a lynchpin to the security of Europe and a proven partner to the United States.

Note:  I encourage those who are questioning the OSCE and other international assessments of the elections to take the time and read the various numerous and detailed reports and documents regarding all phases of the elections - not just the press release.  Keep in mind that there will also be a final OSCE report issued, along with recommendations, probably next month.

http://www.osce.org/odihr/item_12_41433.html

Also check out the IRI, CVU, Opora websites for their assessments.

 

 

Donate to the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation